For a long time considered, improperly, a sort of 'nuclear' option, Article 7 TEU is the key EU Treaty provision in the field of values enforcement. In the context of the Union's current rule of law crisis, such a provision deserves the greatest attention, especially after the European Commission's proposal in December 2017 to trigger the procedure against Poland, under Article 7(1) TEU. This article contributes to understandings of the provision by reviewing its main features and contextualising its deployment in the general Polish rule of law crisis, with the aim of evaluating whether it can now be considered as an operational instrument for values enforcement. Although the Commission's (late) decision to activate the Article 7(1) TEU procedure should be welcomed as a major effort in restoring the rule of law within the European Union, the (perceived and real) limits of Article 7 TEU and the inertia of the EU institutions cast a shadow over the procedure's effective implementation.
Introduction
The European Commission's 20 December 2017 proposal to trigger the procedure envisaged by Article 7(1) TEU against Poland may have come as a surprise for those who were not following the case closely. Nevertheless, such an event was the culmination of two years of dialogue between the Commission and Poland, through which the EU tried to act in response to the recent and rapid ongoing erosion of the rule of law in that country.
The degradation of Poland's liberal structure is one of the greatest signs of the Union's rule of law crisis, that is, an ongoing process in some Member States of widespread and increasing denial of the founding values of the European Union, amongst which is the rule of law.
The rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the European legal order, enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the 'homogeneity clause', which encapsulates the axiological foundation of the European Union, enlisting those values that are 'common to the Member States' and on which the EU is founded. Despite its ambiguity, the core of this principle encompasses The precursor to the sanctioning procedure under Article 7 foresaw a mechanism to determine 'the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State' of the European founding values, as well as to apply sanctions. VI Indeed, after such a determination, made through a unanimity vote of the European Council, the Council could decide by qualified majority to suspend certain rights of the Member State concerned.
As regards the preventive mechanism of Article 7, it was added only some years later, E -277 participate, the event was the source of much concern across Europe, as Haider and other FPÖ members were well-known for their xenophobic and racist positions.
In the following months, the other Member States tried to organise a concerted response, supported by the Portuguese Council presidency (Black and Connolly, 2000) . On 31 January 2000, the Governments of 14 Member States issued a statement in which they declared that they were not willing to accept 'any bilateral official at political level with an Austrian Government integrating the FPÖ'. Moreover, they denied support to any Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organisations and they also decided that 'Austrian Ambassadors in EU capitals will only be received at a technical level'.
VII
While the EU Treaties offered a specific sanctioning provision for addressing the issue, Article 7, Member States decided not to use such a mechanism, the employment of which was urged only by the European Parliament.
VIII As such, they decided to rely on diplomatic and bilateral sanctions, which, although concerted and agreed among all Member States, quickly showed their limitations. Indeed, contacts between the Austrian government and other Member States were maintained in the context of European institutions (Sadurski 2010: 14) . IX Moreover, after the report on the commitment of the Austrian government to respect the common European values commissioned from a group of experts, the 'wise men', X the French Presidency decided to lift the sanctions, which had also the unexpected and negative consequence of fuelling Eurosceptic and populist movements in Austria.
Even though Article 7 was not used in order to deal with the Haider Affair, this event represented a strong impetus for expanding the possibility of a Union's action in the field of values' safeguarding. In the report's conclusions, the authors recommended the introduction of a preventing and monitoring mechanism in Article 7, specifically aimed at dealing such situations within the EU framework, right from their outset (Ahtisaari, Frowein and Oreja 2001: par. 117-118) . This recommendation was then followed during the drafting of the Nice Treaty and paved the way for the introduction of a preventing mechanism in Article 7, that is, the possibility of reacting to the clear risk of a serious violation of EU values. XI Following the proposal by one-third of the Member States, the EP or the Commission, the TEU now foresees a specific warning procedure to be activated by the Council, acting by a majority of fourth-fifth of its Members, after having 
E -278
As a result, Article 7 TEU now consists of a double procedure: a preventive mechanism, described at paragraph 1, and a sanctioning one at paragraphs 2 and 3.
Although these may seem to be two steps of a single instrument, these two procedures should instead be understood as two different and autonomous mechanisms. Notably, they are different, because while the former requires the determination that there is a clear risk of a serious breach, the latter applies only in cases where a serious and persistent breach of the values is already in place. They are also autonomous, as the use of the preventive mechanism does not imply that the sanction mechanism should also be activated. At the same time, the sanction mechanism does not require the prior activation of the preventive mechanism. As Besselink pointed out, 'barking', the warning procedure, and 'biting', the sanctioning one, are 'two different ways to respond to a rule of law crisis' (Besselink 2017: 133) .
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty Article 7 underwent only minor changes.
As regards the warning mechanism, with respect to the previous version, the Lisbon Treaty slightly changed the provision, entrusting broader monitoring powers to the Council, together with the possibility of issuing recommendations before the determination of the existence of a clear risk of serious breach of values is made (Besselink 2017: 133-134) .
If changes in the situation occur, it is for the Council to determine the modification or the lifting of sanctions, acting by a qualified majority (paragraph 4).
Voting arrangements are laid down in Article 354 TFEU: these provide that, in the European Council and in the Council, representatives of the Member State concerned can neither take part in the vote, nor be counted in the calculation of the majorities. As regards to the voting requirements for the European Parliament, Article 354 requires 'the twothirds majority of the votes cast, representing the majority of its component Members'.
A key feature of Article 7 TEU is its scope of application, which is broader than the one of infringement procedures. Indeed, such a provision is considered horizontal and general in scope; the actions of the European Union in values enforcement, rather than being limited to areas covered by EU law, also apply to areas where the Member States act autonomously. The rationale of this feature is linked to the safeguard of the trust between the Member States, as clarified by the Commission, 'here would be something paradoxical about confining the Union's possibilities of action to the areas covered by Union law and asking it to ignore serious breaches in areas of national jurisdiction'.
XII
On the other hand, Article 7 not only has a broad scope of application but also is lex specialis since it does not exclude the application of Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU as mechanisms for values protection when the breach of the latter falls within the scope of EU law.
A long story of non-application of Article 7 TEU
As a matter of fact, the introduction of the Article 7 TEU procedures did not lead to reducing risks of values infringements within the European Union. Despite the magnitude and seriousness of earlier values infringements within the European Union, XIII before the recent Polish case the mechanisms under Article 7 TEU had never been activated, either in sanctioning or in the preventing forms. Since its inclusion in EU Treaties, Article 7 TEU has been extensively seen as a sort of 'nuclear option', as the former Commission's President Barroso called it in 2012, XIV and its deployment was largely considered as a lastresort and practically unfeasible. The reasons behind this idea have been mostly related to four main drawbacks.
A provision of political nature
The element which has been considered as the main limitation of Article 7 TEU relates to the high thresholds required for its activation and the political discretion involved in its triggering. Reinforced qualified majority and unanimity are indeed the main voting requirements for the determination of the clear risk and the existence of values breaches, while the decisive role lies in the hands of the Council; in contrast, the role of the Commission is almost exclusively limited to a right to initiative.
XV
Thresholds are particularly high for the procedures set out in paragraphs 2 and 3, since the former requires unanimity in the European Council, while the latter needs a reinforced qualified majority and also a successful use of the procedure under Article 7(2). As far as 
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considerations will drive the decision as regards the substance of sanctions. The situation is slightly different for the preventing mechanism, where the majority required is lower, namely the fourth-fifths of the Council's members, the Member State concerned does not vote and there is no express reference to sanctions. This fact clearly highlights the political nature of the Article 7 procedures, as well as the reluctance of the Member States to create an effective and supranational judicial control.
As a conclusion, it has been suggested that the nature of the Article 7 procedures involves such high 'considerations of political opportunity' that hardly any Member States would be willing to deploy this mechanism, preferring instead to be guided by 'a habit of mutual indulgence ' (von Bogdandy et al 2012) . For a long time, this view has contributed to the depiction of Article 7 as a politically unfeasible provision.
Article 7 TEU v. the respect for national identity
One of the most frequent justifications for the prevention of the use of Article 7 TEU is the claim for the non-interference of the EU institutions in area not covered by Union law, pursuant to the idea that a provision is not a viable option whenever its use might imperil the 'national identity' of the Member State concerned. Such a statement is usually supported with a reference to Article 4(2) TEU, the 'national identity' clause. This is not to say that Article 7 TEU should be triggered irresponsibly. Indeed, the provision itself acknowledges, as an explicit limiting factor to sanctions, that the Council shall 'take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons' (Article 7(3)). Hence, the consequences of sanctions on populations should be carefully considered and evaluated, encouraging their wise, selective and reasonable use.
How to define a 'serious and persistent breach'?
The last sensitive issue associated with Article 7 TEU relates to the criteria for its Despite efforts made to clarify the topic, it is still difficult to clearly state which concrete violations correspond to the seriousness criteria of values' breaches. The models presented so far are too general and vague to be recognised as a real threshold, and unable to clearly identify a breach of EU values, or a clear risk of it. Without doubt, the activation of Article 7 procedures requires the existence of a threat of particular seriousness and duration. However, the actual notion of the seriousness criteria is still far from clear.
An approach that gives substance to the thresholds for activating Article 7 procedures is therefore probably needed in order to assess their actual operational potential.
Article 7 TEU beyond the 'nuclear myth'
As the analysis above has shown, the procedures envisaged by Article 7 TEU suffer from being of an extremely political and discretional nature. This circumstance is intensified by the lack of clear benchmarks aimed at giving substance to the criteria for the activation of the two mechanisms as well as the possible side-effects of the measure in terms of popular support.
For a long time these shortcomings made Article 7 a dormant, and nuclear, provision; however, notwithstanding these limitations the Article should instead be considered as what it actually is: an important legal instrument at the Union's disposal. The characterisation of Article 7 as a 'nuclear option' has been definitely overstated. A system that claims to be a 'Community of law', based on the rule of law, should have the foresight to include mechanisms to prevent and sanction non-compliance with its founding values.
In this respect, Article 7 has the merit to 'enhance supranationalism' within the EU (Sadurski 2010: 33-34) notably by overcoming the issue of competence by addressing violations committed by any Member State regardless of whether or not they were carried out implementing Union law. It represents a key feature of the values-protection system within the EU, giving it (at least formal) credentials to define itself as 'a Community based on the rule of law', XXIII and to stress that violations of the founding values by any Member
State concern not only that country but the European Union as a whole.
Poland and abuses of the rule of law: an overview
In May 2015 the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereafter PiS), led by Jarosław Kaczyński, won the presidency of Poland with the election of President Andrzej Duda. A few months later, in October, PiS also won the Polish parliamentary elections.
The path the country started to follow from that moment was anything but promising in terms of rule of law and respect for European values. In particular, the most worrisome measures concerned the reform of the judiciary; these risked undermining judicial independence as well as democratic checks and balances.
The main target of such illiberal reforms was the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. Since an overarching analysis of the overall context is beyond the ambition of this work, here it is enough to recall some of the key events that raised concerns over the rule of law situation in Poland and paved the way for the Commission's actions. 
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recommendation' where it will set a deadline for compliance and recommend that the Member State find a solution to the problems identified, while also suggesting some specific instructions and indications.
Since the overall context of the rule of law deterioration in Poland is important in order to understand whether the actions of the Commission were justified and appropriate, the 
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other measures introduced by the Law raised further concerns as they risked preventing the effective work of the Tribunal. As noticed by the Venice Commission, the amendments to the sequence rule still did not guarantee sufficient flexibility in the work of the Tribunal, as they granted the power to apply the limited exception to the President.
XXIX Moreover, the powers of the Prosecutor General, who from March 2016 also became the Minister of Justice, were dramatically increased. Since his presence is always required in cases before the full bench, including complex ones, his absence is now sufficient to prevent hearings to take place. XXX Taking into account the joint effect of these reforms, it was not hard to imagine a risk of politicisation of the Tribunal. Such a concern was also reinforced by the fact that the request of three judges was sufficient to refer a case to the full bench (Article 26(1)(1)(g)).
The Tribunal itself struck down the law-package twice. 
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With respect to the draft law on the Supreme Court, it envisaged the retirement of high court judges at the age of 65 (the former limit was 70). Since this provision also applied to current sitting judges, it would force the retirement of nearly 40 percent of the court's judges in a short period of time: such a measure not only would undermine the current judges' 'security of tenure' but also endanger 'the independence of the Supreme Court in general'.
XLII
The reply of the Polish Government of the Commission's recommendation was sent in August 2017. It came as no surprise that Warsaw disagreed with all the concerns expressed in the recommendation XLIII and made no mention of any measures to address them.
XLIV
And besides, on 8 December 2017, the Sejm adopted the two problematic laws, which were then approved by the Senate one week later.
The triggering of Article 7 TEU against Poland: a (late) step in the right direction?
In light of the difficulties encountered in engaging Poland in a constructive dialogue, on 20 December 2017 the European Commission (finally) decided to submit a reasoned proposal to the Council for a decision on the determination of 'a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law referred to in Article 2 TEU'. XLV The
Commission found that in two years Poland had adopted 13 laws which heavily altered the structure of the judicial system, allowing political power 'to interfere significantly with the composition, the powers, the administration and the functioning' of judicial authorities and bodies. XLVI According to the draft Decision, the Council should assess the clear risk of a serious breach by Poland of the rule of law and also recommend that the independence of the Tribunal be restored, its judgments fully implemented and its members lawfully appointed; whilst the four laws challenged in Recommendation 2017/1520 should be 'amended in order to ensure their compliance with the requirements relating to the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers and legal certainty'. 
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While it remains extremely difficult to say how the political scenario will evolve, the Commission's decision to (finally) propose the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU is an important step, being the very first time in the history of the EU. Employing Article 7(1) TEU would be beneficial, firstly, as it would emphasise the role of the rule of law within the Union, reinforcing and reiterating its structure as 'a Community based on the rule of law'. Secondly, it would contribute to the re-establishment of EU credibility when it comes to its founding values, a remarkable step in a period when the Union's authority is regularly challenged, both internally and externally. 
Conclusions
In light of the analysis and the considerations made above, it is now possible to draw some conclusions as regards the EU's approach towards Poland's rule of law problems and whether the latter case contributed to the transformation of Article 7 TEU in becoming an active instrument for values enforcement.
Although the Commission's New Framework was conceived in complementarity with both the Article 7 TEU procedures and the traditional infringement proceedings, this new mechanism contributed to the further characterisation of Article 7 as a last-resort, nuclear, option. As already recalled, such a connotation does not reflect the nature and the spirit of the procedures envisaged by the provision. There is nothing nuclear in using a mechanism foreseen by the EU Treaties for tackling a specific worrisome situation of value-violation, or the risk thereof. Procedures provided by EU law are indeed there to be applied. It should also be noted that while the voting requirements of Article 7 are particularly high, at least as regards the sanctioning mechanism the thresholds can be reached in an easier way.
If deployed at the right time and wisely, the Article 7(1) procedure can help to signal the risk of a serious breach of EU values before it materialises. Rather than being nuclear, it has instead a preventive function (Bonelli 2017).
Alas, the EU institutions have failed to take advantage of this instrument. By delaying the application of Article 7(1) TEU for an unreasonable period of time (in order either to give preference to more dialogical instruments or to address minor issues through This is not to say that Article 7 should be used in a careless and uncritical way. As already acknowledged, the use of this instrument, and especially of the sanctioning mechanism, runs the risk of increasing popular resistance and democratic backlashes against the EU. However, rather than acting as a deterrent from its use, such considerations should instead promote a wise and proper application of Article 7 in cases when it is needed to address or prevent a critical situation of value-violation.
In the Work Programme 2018, the Commission proposed a new 'initiative to strengthen the enforcement of the rule of law in the European Union' to be launched before the end of 2018.
LXI There is little clue as regards the form that such an initiative might take. LXII Yet, we can at least say what it should not be: another device to seek avoidance of EU Treaties or a mechanism to further duplicate or, worse, delay current instruments and procedures. The Union may well lose the battle against authoritarian illiberal forces, but at least it has to fight for its values.
Unfortunately, in practice, things seem to be moving in the opposite direction. While in the literature the 'nuclear weapon' myth about Article 7 has largely been dismantled (Kochenov 2017: 8; 12) , in the realm of politics the Article cannot be considered a suitable instrument. Indeed, both the EU institutions and several Member States still do not appear inclined to use it. The events of the Polish rule of law crisis, and the attempts of the Commission to tackle this, sadly demonstrated it. Therefore, if referring to Article 7 TEU as a 'nuclear option' is undoubtedly a misnomer, its highly political nature and the vague criteria for its activation cast a shadow over its effective implementation. What clearly emerges from the overall analysis is the Union's difficulties in dealing with the 'Copenhagen dilemma', LXIV that is, the gap between the commitment of candidate countries to respect the rule of law at the time of accession to the EU and the Union's actual capacity to enforce these criteria. The EU has to act in this respect. If it fails to do so and to address the current rule of law crisis in an appropriate way, there will be serious consequences for the Union as a whole. Indeed, the rule of law crisis is not just one among the many crises the Union is facing, as the rule of law is a key prerequisite for both the application of EU law throughout the Union and the maintenance of mutual trust among Member States and European citizens (Closa 2016: 15-16 ' We need a better developed set of instruments-not just the alternative between the "soft power" of political persuasion and the "nuclear option" of article 7 of the Treaty' (Barroso 2012). XV It has been argued in the literature that Article 7 TEU also entrusts the Commission with the monitoring competence to determine the existence of a serious breach by a Member State of the Article 2 TEU values, as well as the risk thereof (Mori 2016: 6) . XVI What it is known for sure is that EU membership cannot be suspended, since only Article 50 TEU paves the way for leaving the Union on the basis of a voluntary withdrawal of the concerned Member State (Besselink 2017: 131) . XVII 'The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State'. XVIII CJEU, Case 26-62, van Gend & Loos, [1963 ], ECLI:EU:C:1963 CJEU, Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L, [1964] , ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. XIX CJEU, Opinion 2/13, [2014] , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, par.167. XX 'This legal structure is based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected'. Ibid, par. 168. XXI It is worth mentioning that, according to the 'wise men' report (supra, note 10), the rise of nationalist feelings in Austria was a side effect of the measures taken by fourteen Member States against the Haider government, since they were sometimes 'wrongly understood as sanctions directed against Austrian citizens ' (Ahtisaari, Frowein, Oreja, 2001: par. 116 XXXVIII For what concerns the political belief behind the Polish reforms, the rhetoric applied by the ruling party has been almost the same: a continuous discredit of the polish post-1989 institutions and laws, perceived as an attempt to restore the communist past. Indeed, according to the discourse of Mr. J. Kaczyński, the PiS leader, the previous communist elite still enjoys great power in the country after having colluded with the liberal politicians (Foy, 2016) . XXXIX In November 2017 the Court of Justice issued a remarkable decision where it ordered to Poland to cease all logging operations in the Białowiezȧ forest, except when such activity was essential to ensure the public safety of persons. Surprisingly, it also affirmed its jurisdiction to impose penalty payments in the context of an interim relief ruling under Article 279 TFEU (€100000 per day of non-compliance, starting from the date on notification of the order), an absolute novelty for the Court's jurisprudence. Such an outstanding decision clearly stressed the serious threshold that the Polish rule of law crisis has reached, while restating the fundamental role that EU values play in the European legal order. CJEU, Order in Case C-441/17 R, European Commission, v. Republic of Poland, [2017] . XL Recommendations (EU) 2016 /1374 , (EU) 2017 /146 and (EU) 2017 /1520 , Brussels, 20 December 2017 . XLIV In a speech on the rule of law in Poland at the EP's LIBE Committee the Vice-President Timmermans stressed that Polish authorities did not announce any concrete measures to address the issues raised in the third rule of law Recommendation, while none of the four letters sent by the Commission to the Polish government inviting them to meet was accepted (Timmermans 2017 press-room/20180625IPR06503/rule-of-law-in-hungaryparliament-should-ask-council-to-act-say-committee-meps. LVII Supra, note 39. LVIII CJEU, C-64/16, Associacaõ Sindical dos Juiźes Portugueses, [2018] , EU:C:2018:117. LIX In the LM case the Court of Justice affirmed that the judicial authority executing a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) could refuse to do so by way of exception when it has proof that the person in respect of whom the EAW was issued will, 'if surrendered to the issuing judicial authority, suffer a breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial a right guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter' (par. 59). In order to make such an assessment, the executing judicial authority has to collect material 'that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated' and it also must 'assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for believing that, following his surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person will run that risk' (par. 61 and 68). Quite importantly, the CJEU specified, as regards the first step of the assessment, that 'information in a reasoned proposal recently addressed by the Commission to the Council on the basis of Article 7(1) TEU is particularly relevant for the purposes of that assessment' (par. 61). Yet, at the same time the Court stated that the executing judicial authority could automatically refuse to execute an EAW 'without having to carry out any specific assessment' only if the European Council had adopted on the basis of Article 7(2) TEU, stating the existence of a serious and persistent breach of the values at Article 2 TE in the issuing Member State (par. 72 Scheppele (2016) . LXIV 'Today everybody mentions the situation in Hungary and Romania. Are we sure that we will not see such a situation again in a couple of weeks in another EU country? Now let us be honest -and some of the parliamentarians have said it very clearly -we face a Copenhagen dilemma. We are very strict on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law in the accession process of a new Member State but, once this Member State has joined the European Union, we appear not to have any instrument to see whether the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary still command respect'. European Parliament, Plenary debate on the political situation in Romania, statement by V. Reding, former European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, 12 September 2012.
